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Abstract
In the wake of the major accounting scandals,
internal auditing has emerged as a powerful
force in promoting effective controls, risk
management, and governance in U.S.
companies. This article highlights recent
internal audit-related problems that were
revealed in SOX Section 404 reports and offers
specific recommendations for building an
effective, value-adding internal audit function.

Introduction
Since the major accounting scandals in 2001
and 2002, as well as the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002), the
internal auditing profession has experienced

unprecedented growth and prominence.
Internal audit budgets, staffing, and
boardroom exposure have increased (Carcello,
Hermanson, and Raghunandan 2005), and the
Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) has seen an
explosion of membership and interest. In fact,
one prominent CFO stated, “[Internal] auditors
are rock stars now. This is their day in the sun”
(Liebs 2004).
Internal auditors are experts in governance, risk
management, and internal control—areas that
many companies have emphasized to achieve
compliance with SOX. Many public companies
have dealt with SOX Section 404 audits of the
effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting, and a host of organizations are
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exploring the implementation of enterprise risk
management tools. On top of these challenges,
the pressure to produce reliable financial
reports has caused many audit committees to
lean more heavily on their internal auditors for
information and technical guidance related to
risks and controls.
Given recent developments, we believe that
almost any organization can benefit from an
effective internal audit function. In this article,
we (a) describe the role of internal audit in the
organization, (b) highlight some recent internal
audit problems revealed in SOX Section 404
reports, and (c) offer practical suggestions for
building an effective, value-adding internal
audit function. We hope that the insights
provided will be useful to managers and
audit committee members in a variety
of organizations.

The Role of Internal Audit
The IIA (2007b) defines internal auditing as
follows:
Internal auditing is an independent,
objective assurance and consulting activity
designed to add value and improve an
organization’s operations. It helps an
organization accomplish its objectives by
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach
to evaluate and improve the effectiveness
of risk management, control, and
governance processes.

The key to internal audit adding value is
that it provides objective evaluations of an
organization’s processes and operations. The
main focus is on improving risk management,
internal controls, and governance so that
stakeholders’ value is preserved. In other
words, internal audit seeks to improve the
organization’s operations and to reduce the
chance of negative surprises, including those
created by unreliable financial reporting.
Through its monitoring efforts in such areas
as fraud prevention, improving business
processes, and promoting reliable information
(including financial reports) and sound controls,
a properly designed and functioning internal
audit group can add significant value to an
organization. Effective internal audit functions
also can contribute greatly to SOX Section 404
audits, performing some work on which the
external auditor can rely. Such arrangements
can reduce Section 404 compliance costs.1
New York Stock Exchange companies are
required to have an internal audit function.
For other U.S. companies, internal audit is
a voluntary mechanism. Internal auditing
appears to be growing rapidly in popularity,
whether implemented as an in-house function
or outsourced to an accounting firm or other
provider. Research suggests that there is
significant protection in having an internal
audit function. For example, Beasley, Carcello,
Hermanson, and Lapides (2000) found that
the presence of an internal audit function was
much less common in companies that had been
accused of accounting fraud by the Securities
and Exchange Commission. The differences
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent firms

Internal auditors are experts in governance, risk management,
and internal control—areas that many companies have
emphasized to achieve compliance.
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were particularly noticeable in two industries.
In the technology industry, none of the fraud
firms had an internal audit function, versus
82 percent of the no-fraud firms. In the
healthcare industry, 13 percent of the
fraudulent firms had an internal audit function,
versus 74 percent of the non-fraudulent firms.
Clearly, there is a strong association between
the presence of an internal audit function and
reduced accounting fraud risk.

misstatement of the annual or interim financial
statements will not be prevented or detected.”
The standard states that one strong indicator
of a material weakness is (para. 140): “The
internal audit function or the risk assessment
function is ineffective at a company for which
such a function needs to be effective for the
company to have an effective monitoring or
risk assessment component, such as for very
large or highly complex companies.” 3

Recent Internal Audit Problems

The Audit Analytics database revealed 16
public companies from late 2004 through
mid-October 2006 with internal audit-related
material weaknesses or remediation plans.
In each case, either the Section 404 report
highlighted an internal audit-related material
weakness, or management’s plan to remedy a
material weakness included some discussion of
enhancing the internal audit function. While
these 16 companies represent a very small
percentage of public companies subject to SOX
Section 404, we believe that these weaknesses
illustrate important issues for managers and
audit committee members to consider.

We believe that one way to learn how to
“do internal audit right” is to study cases
where there have been internal audit-related
problems. To highlight deficiencies in the
internal audit arena, we recently searched
SOX Section 404 internal control reports for
cases where there were material weaknesses
in internal control related to the company’s
internal audit function.2
Section 404 of SOX requires the external
auditor to test the company’s internal control
over financial reporting, and to highlight any
material weaknesses that existed as of the end
of the fiscal year. Compliance with Section 404
currently is required for public companies with
over $75 million in public float and will
be required for smaller public companies
in the future.
According to PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2
(PCAOB 2004, para. 10), “A material weakness
is a significant deficiency, or combination of
significant deficiencies, that results in more
than a remote likelihood that a material

Exhibit 1 provides an overview of the 16
companies’ size, industry, auditor, and material
weaknesses. The companies are reasonably
large, with median market value, revenues,
and assets in the $500 million or higher range,
and they are primarily manufacturing or
financial firms. Most of the companies have
Big 4 external auditors and typically have other
internal control problems in addition to their
internal audit issues (the median number of
material weaknesses per company is 4.5, with a
range of 1–10).
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Exhibit 1
Sample Description – Companies with Internal
Audit-Related Problems (n = 16)
Panel A: Company Size ($000s)
					
Market Value (n = 14)			
Revenues (n = 15)		
Assets (n = 15)			

Median
798,959
482,619
684,094

Panel B: SIC Codes
						
1000–1999 Mining and Construction		
2000–3999 Manufacturing			

N
1
6

4000–4999 Transportation and
Communication
5000–5999 Wholesale and Retail		

1
2

6000–6999 Financial, Insurance, and
Real Estate		
7000–7999 Services				
Total					

4
2
16

Panel C: External Audit Firm
						
Big 4						
National Firms, Non Big 4			
Local Firms					
Total					

N
9
3
4
16

Panel D: Total Number of Material Weaknesses
Median number of material weaknesses
per company					
Range of material weaknesses
per company				

4.5
1 – 10

Exhibit 2 presents wording quoted or adapted
from the 16 companies’ 10-Ks (which contain
the management and external auditor reports
on internal control) that describes the internal
audit problems and management’s efforts to

fix/remediate the problems. While many of
the disclosures do not provide much detail (we
provide the full text of the relevant portions
in Exhibit 2), some interesting overall patterns
emerge from reviewing this table.
In terms of material weaknesses, the
most commonly cited issue is the lack of a
comprehensive or effective internal audit
program/function (seven companies). This
problem generally refers to a pervasive failure
to implement effective internal auditing,
which means that internal auditors do not
adequately monitor key risks and controls.
This problem also can result from internal
audit getting “sidetracked” by management
requests. For example, the disclosure for Ligand
Pharmaceuticals Inc. indicates that the internal
audit department was redirected to help with
the company’s restatement of its financial
statements, the Director of Internal Audit
resigned, and the company did not complete
much of its internal audit work.
Other problems with internal audit include (a)
a lack of independence in the internal audit
function (Composite Technology and Ligand
Pharmaceuticals), (b) insufficient oversight of
internal audit/internal audit focus (Cellstar
and Ultra Petroleum), and (c) issues related
to inadequate auditing of international
operations (H. B. Fuller and Thermadyne
Holdings). Other problems mentioned include
having too few internal auditors, having
inexperienced internal auditors, not having
an internal audit function at all, or internal
audit failing to address problems found in
control testing.
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Exhibit 2
Internal Audit-Related Control Weaknesses in SOX 404 Reports
Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

99 Cents
Only
Stores
2004

• Did not have a sufficient number of
or appropriate depth of experience
for accounting and finance, inventory
management, real estate management,
information technology, or internal
audit personnel.
• Did not have an adequate monitoring
program, including full testing of
its internal control systems and a
comprehensive internal audit function.

• Adequately staffing its accounting
and finance, inventory management,
real estate management, information
technology and internal audit
departments.
• Developing an adequate monitoring
program, including full testing of
its internal control systems and a
comprehensive internal audit function.

Accupoll
• The insufficient or lacking procedures
Holding
and structures include, but are not
Corp. 2005 limited to (1) a failure to authorize and
empower standing committees of the
Board, including an audit committee
and a compensation committee,
(2) a failure to approve governance
structures including charters,
delegations of authority, codes of ethics
and appropriate conduct for officers
and directors, controls regarding
conflicts of interest, definition of
roles and responsibilities, approval of
budgets, and (3) a lack of an internal
audit function.

• An internal audit function will be
developed to perform periodic reviews
to evaluate adherence to formalized
procedures and controls over the
financial reporting processes performed
by the Company.

Aspen
• No specific mention of internal audit in
Technology, material weaknesses.
Inc. 2005

• Hired additional accounts receivable,
tax and internal audit personnel,
including a Director of Internal Audit
and a Director of Tax.

		
(continued)
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Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

• Ineffective controls at the entity
Bally
Technologies, level: As evidenced by the material
weaknesses described above, and
Inc. 2005
management’s final assessment of our
internal controls, we have determined
that our entity-level controls related
to the control environment, risk
assessment, monitoring function
and dissemination of information
and communication activities did
not operate effectively, resulting in
a material weakness in each COSO
component (COSO 1992). Such entitylevel controls, and a comprehensive
monitoring of internal controls by
the internal audit function, are part
of the framework to ensure that the
designed system of internal control is
operating effectively to ensure that
significant transactions are adequately
identified, recorded and disclosed.

• No remediation efforts related to
internal audit.

Bristow
Group, Inc.
2005

• Internal audits are planned to ensure
that the compliance program is
followed.

• No specific mention of internal audit
in material weaknesses.

Cellstar Corp. • The Company did not maintain
effective controls over the focus of the
2004
internal audit function.

• Increasing the level of monitoring
through the internal audit function.

Clearly, there is a strong association between the presence of an
internal audit function and reduced accounting fraud risk.
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Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

China Energy • Lack of Internal Audit System.
The internal audit department
Savings
was ineffective in preventing and
Technology,
detecting control lapses and errors in
Inc. 2005
the accounting of certain key areas
like revenue recognition, purchase
approvals, inter-company transactions,
cash receipt and cash disbursement
authorizations, inventory safeguard
and proper accumulation for cost
of products, in accordance with the
appropriate costing method used by
the company.

• Evaluating the internal audit function
in relation to the Company’s financial
resources and requirements.

Clifton
• The Company’s internal audit
Savings
program was not sufficient to provide
Bancorp, Inc. management a basis to assess the
2005
quality of the Company’s internal
control performance over time.
Accordingly, management concluded
that the monitoring component of
the Company’s internal control over
financial reporting was not effective.
Internal control monitoring involves
assessing the design and operation of
internal control on a timely basis, and
taking necessary corrective actions.

• We will review the need for additional
compliance/internal audit personnel.
• We will request testing reports from
our internal auditor on a regular basis.

Composite • The Company did not have an
independent internal audit
Technology
function due to the small size of the
Corp.
organization.
2005

• Evaluating the internal audit function
in relation to the Company’s financial
resources and requirements.

(continued)
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Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

• Management believes that the
Flagstar
deficiencies noted above may have
Bancorp, Inc.
been the result of weaknesses such as
2004
(1) certain personnel lacking sufficient
expertise in areas of U.S. GAAP, (2)
inadequately trained employees, such
as personnel who perform certain
accounting functions that rely heavily
on supervisors to identify problems
and errors, (3) lack of communication
between certain departments, (4)
internal audit’s failure to address
certain issues identified in the internal
controls testing and (5) security around
user access rights to certain application
systems.
H. B. Fuller
Company
2004

• In its assessment as of November
27, 2004, management identified
as a material weakness, insufficient
supervision and oversight of certain
local accounting personnel in its
Chilean accounting operations.
Specifically, Company policy did
not provide for regional financial
management or internal audit review
of the local books and records of the
smaller locations within the Company’s
Latin America region, which includes
the Chilean operations. As a result
of this material weakness in internal
control, H.B. Fuller Company’s financial
statements were misstated due to
the intentional recording of incorrect
accounting entries by local accounting
personnel under the supervision of the

Remediation(s) related to internal audit
• No remediation efforts related to
internal audit.

• The company is in the process of
expanding internal audit resources in
the Latin America region.
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Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

H. B. Fuller
Company
2004

Chilean financial controller beginning
in 1999, and continuing through
the third quarter of 2004. These
incorrect accounting entries resulted
in the overstatement of other current
assets and income taxes payable, the
understatement of notes payable
and trade payables, and a cumulative
overstatement of net income during the
aforementioned period amounting to
$3.1 million.

(continued)

• [After a discussion of a material
Impac
weakness] We also noted significant
Mortgage
Holdings, Inc. deficiencies in that our internal audit
function did not provide an adequate
2004
or effective monitoring of our
controls, and we needed to evaluate
whether we have appropriate internal
resources to manage and monitor
work performed by our outsourced
tax compliance function.

Ligand
Pharmaceuticals Inc.
2005

• Internal Audit. The Company did
not maintain an independent effective
Internal Audit Department. This material
weakness resulted from the fact that:
1) the Internal Audit Department was
redirected during the second, third
and fourth quarters of 2005 to assist
with the restatement of the Company’s
consolidated financial statements,

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

• We hired outside consultants to
assist our internal audit group in
documenting our accounting and
business processes and identifying
areas that require control or process
improvement.
• We hired a Director of Internal Audit
whose primary responsibilities are
to perform risk assessment and
monitoring of our system of internal
controls and, in addition, to oversee
the establishment of formal policies
and procedures throughout our
organization.
• Internal Audit Plan. As discussed under
the caption Remediation Relating to
Accounting Personnel, the Company is
in the process of recruiting a Director
of Internal Audit and such position is
targeted to be filled during the second
quarter of 2006, or as soon as possible
thereafter. Until the position is filled,
the Company has engaged a nationally
(continued)
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Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

Ligand
Pharmaceuticals Inc.
2005

and 2) the Director of Internal Audit
resigned December 2, 2005. As a
result, the Company’s Internal Audit
Department executed only a small
portion of the activities contemplated
to be performed pursuant to the 2005
internal audit plan. In late December
2005, the Company engaged a
nationally recognized consulting firm
to perform the planned activities of
the Internal Audit Department, most
notably the Company’s compliance
efforts with respect to Section 404 of
the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. While
this material weakness did not result
in adjustments to the Company’s 2005
consolidated financial statements,
it is reasonably possible that, if not
remediated, given the importance of
a functioning effective Internal Audit
Department in the maintenance of
effective internal controls over financial
reporting, this material weakness could
result in a material misstatement of
the Company’s financial statement
accounts that might result in a material
misstatement to a future annual or
interim period.

r ecognized external consulting firm to
perform the functions of the Internal
Audit Department. It is anticipated
that the 2006 Internal Audit Plan will
be approved by the Audit Committee
in the second quarter of 2006, and
until the Director of Internal Audit
is hired, the Company will continue
to utilize the consulting firm to
implement and execute the 2006
internal audit plan.
• Monitoring Controls. As discussed
under Internal Audit Plan above,
the Company is in the process of
recruiting a Director of Internal
Audit. Additionally, and until the
Company has hired the Director of
Internal Audit, the Company has
engaged a nationally recognized
external consulting firm to implement
and execute the 2006 internal audit
plan starting in the second quarter
of 2006. As part of the internal
audit plan, these consultants will be
responsible for assisting management
with updating and maintaining the
Company’s documentation of internal
control over financial reporting. The
consultants will also be used until
and after the hiring of the Director
of Internal Audit to assist with the
testing of such internal controls
and in monitoring the progress of
any ongoing and newly identified
remediation efforts to help ensure the
timely completion of the Company’s
2006 monitoring program.

(continued)

While the scope of the internal audit function will vary greatly
across organizations, we believe that just about every organization
can benefit from effective internal auditing.
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Company

Deficiencies related to internal audit

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

Riggs
National
Corporation
2004

• As of December 31, 2004, the
Company’s internal audit program
was not sufficient to provide
management a basis to assess the
quality of the Company’s internal
control performance over time.
Accordingly, management concluded
that the monitoring component of
the Company’s internal control over
financial reporting was not effective.
Internal control monitoring involves
assessing the design and operation of
internal control on a timely basis, and
taking necessary corrective actions.

• The Company enhanced the internal
audit program during 2004 and has
now completed implementation
of that program. However, as of
December 31, 2004 the updated
internal audit program was not in
place for a sufficient time period to
fully determine its effectiveness. The
Company will continue to enhance
its internal audit function in 2005
by expanding the scope of certain
internal audits, enhancing the
tracking of outsourced audit work,
and modifying its existing internal
audit plan as necessary. This will also
include continued focus and review
of regulatory risk through the use of
internal audit, including outsourced
internal audit resources.

Thermadyne • During the year-end financial
statement close process, we identified
Holdings
unexpected variations in the balance
Corp.
sheet data provided from our
2004
Brazilian subsidiary. After a rigorous
internal audit at this subsidiary, it
was concluded that certain period
costs were improperly capitalized and
included in inventory and intangibles.
In addition, certain contingent tax
refunds were improperly recognized
prior to being received. In response to
the errors identified at our Brazilian
subsidiary, we performed internal
audit procedures at our South African
subsidiaries and determined that key

• In order to remediate our insufficient
controls relating to the oversight
and monitoring of our smaller
international locations, we will
augment internal audit work already
performed with a more extensive
internal audit program for 2005
that will include work performed at
our smaller foreign locations, and
additional audit resources.

(continued)
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Company
Thermadyne
Holdings
Corp.
2004
(continued)

Ultra
Petroleum
Corp.
2005

Deficiencies related to internal audit

Remediation(s) related to internal audit

account reconciliations were not being
performed in accounts receivable,
inventory, and accounts payable.
The internal audits at these locations
resulted in adjustments recorded
during the fourth quarter of 2004 to
accounts receivable, inventory, prepaid
expenses, intangibles, goodwill, and
cost of sales. We have concluded
that a material weakness exists due
to insufficient controls relating to
the oversight and monitoring of our
smaller international locations.
• The Company did not maintain
effective company level controls.
Specifically, (1) certain of its
accounting personnel in key roles
did not possess an appropriate level
of technical expertise, and (2) the
Company’s monitoring of the internal
audit function was not sufficient to
provide management a basis to assess
the quality of the Company’s internal
control performance over time.

• Increasing training for the Company’s
current accounting personnel, hiring
additional accounting personnel
and engaging outside consultants
with technical accounting expertise,
as needed, and reorganizing the
accounting department to ensure that
accounting personnel have adequate
experience, skills and knowledge
relating to the accounting and
internal audit functions assigned
to them.

Note: The wording above is quoted or adapted from the companies’ auditor reports or management reports
on internal control.
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Management’s discussion of any remediation
efforts most commonly addresses staffing
issues—hiring an Internal Audit Director, hiring
additional internal audit staff, or engaging an
outside consultant. Having the right people
in place is absolutely critical to effective
internal auditing, but internal audit talent is
in high demand in today’s market. Thus, it is
challenging for some companies to attract and
retain top internal audit talent.
Other remedial steps cited include:
• enhancing international auditing efforts,
• evaluating the overall internal audit function
in light of company characteristics,
• developing/enhancing a comprehensive
internal audit function, and
• addressing such issues as compliance
auditing, additional testing/scope, greater
communication through internal audit
reports, better tracking of outsourced
internal audit work, and increased training.

Suggestions for Managers and Audit
Committee Members
How can organizations build their internal
audit functions to provide maximum value?
Based on the types of weaknesses identified
in Exhibit 2, as well as our own experience
researching internal audit issues for several
years, we offer the following suggestions for
management and audit committee members.
We also encourage interested readers to
consult a host of IIA resources available online
at http://www.theiia.org/theiia/about-theprofession/about-the-internal-audit-profession/
and the AICPA’s (2004) Evaluating the Internal
Audit Team: Guidelines and Questions.

• Setting up an Internal Audit Function. Some
organizations do not yet have an internal
audit function, due to small organization size
or lack of management or board support.
While the scope of the internal audit function
will vary greatly across organizations, we
believe that just about every organization
can benefit from effective internal auditing.
Those beginning the process of establishing
an internal audit function are encouraged
to visit the IIA website (see Establishing an
Internal Audit Shop, IIA 2007a) for tips in
this regard. This process may start with one
internal auditor, perhaps even part time,
but we believe that this function is critical to
effective governance, risk management, and
control in the organization.
• A Clear Internal Audit Charter. The internal
audit charter should clearly establish the
role and responsibilities of the internal
audit function. If the charter is deficient, it
increases the chance that internal audit will
be sidetracked into non-core activities or
simply fail to comprehensively monitor the
organization’s risks and controls. The charter
should unambiguously describe the scope
of internal audit’s activities—both for the
benefit of keeping internal audit on task,
as well as informing others of the role of
internal audit (see Tarr (2003) for
specific guidance).
• The Right People. If internal audit is going to
be a major player in the organization, getting
the right people on board is critical, especially
in the Director of Internal Audit role (referred
to as the “Chief Audit Executive”
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in IIA professional standards). Organizations
need to consider the quantity of internal
audit personnel needed, which may be less
than some would imagine. Also critical are
desired skill sets, which should match the
types of risks faced by the organization.
Some internal audit groups may require
people with backgrounds in environmental
issues, complex financial instruments,
healthcare regulations, etc. Organizations
need to recognize that internal audit talent
can be expensive in today’s market. Finally,
the organization should carefully consider
whether internal audit will be an in-house
function or will be outsourced to major
accounting firm or other provider. There
are advantages and disadvantages to each
structure (see Rittenberg 1997; Rittenberg,
Moore, and Covaleski 1999).
• Carefully Constructed Reporting Channels. To
whom does internal audit report? An internal
audit group cannot easily provide objective
oversight of management if the Chief Audit
Executive reports only to management. After
all, it is difficult to be the watchdog of one’s
boss. What many, including the IIA, have
called for is primary internal audit reporting
to the audit committee, with administrative
reporting to management (CFO, Controller,
or even CEO) since the audit committee is not
on-site most of the time. If the internal audit
function is to be sufficiently independent,
then it is critical that it report to the audit
committee and not be under the control of
management. Currently, the pendulum clearly
has swung toward audit committee (rather
than management) oversight of internal

audit. Many of internal audit’s activities
now are related to performing assurance
work for the audit committee, rather than
“internal consulting” or special projects for
management.
• Covering International Risks. As indicated
by two of the companies in the sample,
covering international risks can be a challenge
for internal audit. Remote locations often
involve language and culture issues, as well
as significant travel and time costs. Despite
these challenges, it is worthwhile to carefully
consider international risks and to appreciate
the implications of a reduced emphasis on
international operations due to the hassle
and cost of auditing them. Problems in an
international location can become significant
corporate issues.
• Monitoring the Internal Audit Function.
Once the internal audit function is designed
and operational, it is important to continue
to monitor internal audit’s activities. Both
the audit committee and top management
may participate in this monitoring, as each
party benefits from internal audit’s efforts.
Questions to consider in this monitoring
process include the following:
• Are we comfortable with the quality of
internal audit’s work? Are we learning new
things from internal audit’s reports?
• Does the scope of internal audit’s work seem
adequate? Does it appear to match our
understanding of organizational risks?
• How is internal audit viewed in the
organization? Is internal audit a major
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“player” in organizational decisions? Do
people in the organization seek internal
audit’s advice, or do they avoid internal audit
at all costs?
• Does the internal audit staffing level
appear adequate? Does the internal audit
budget consider all essential areas? Does
management try to constrain internal audit
through budgetary means?
• Have internal audit’s findings and
recommendations been communicated to
us in a timely and understandable manner?
Have the recommendations resulted in valueadding changes in the organization?
• Does the Chief Audit Executive communicate
well with the audit committee? Does this
person appear to have the respect of
management and the external auditor?
• Has internal audit’s work improved our
understanding of the organization’s internal
controls and risks?
• Is internal audit responsive to audit
committee requests for work in certain areas?
• Is internal audit responsive to audit
committee suggestions for improvement?
• Do we perceive that the benefits of the
internal audit function outweigh the costs of
the function? Do we gather any metrics that
are used in making such an assessment of
internal audit costs and benefits?

Conclusion
Internal audit can be a powerful tool for
improving operations, enhancing controls,
managing risks, and promoting sound
corporate governance. In the current
environment of high accountability and
continuing governance failures (e.g., stock
option backdating), such elements are vital to
organizational success.
Our review of recent internal audit problems
cited in SOX Section 404 reports illustrates
that not all companies have implemented
effective internal audit functions. We believe
that companies can learn from these problems,
and we have offered several suggestions to
managers and audit committee members
for building an effective, value-adding
internal audit function. We hope that these
suggestions will help to drive future internal
audit improvements.
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Endnotes
1

S ee IIA (2004) for details on the role of internal
audit in Section 404 audits.

2

 e examined management’s internal control
W
report and the auditor’s opinion on internal
control over financial reporting, which often
contain identical language to describe the
material weaknesses. Typically, the auditor
identifies the material weaknesses.
See COSO (1992) for discussion of the internal
control framework and the importance of
monitoring internal controls over time. Internal
audit often takes the lead in monitoring the
control system.
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Abstract

Introduction

To advance our knowledge about Internet
abuse in the workplace, this study examines
how deterrence mechanisms commonly
used within organizations impact individual
decisions to abuse the Internet. The study uses
a policy-capturing approach to test the relative
degree of deterrence imposed by common
components of Internet acceptable use policies
(AUPs). The results provide evidence that an
AUP that defines acceptable Internet usage,
imposes potential sanctions, and implements
detection (or monitoring) mechanisms is an
important deterrent of Internet abuse. In
addition, these mechanisms are most effective
when they are actively enforced. The study
provides valuable insights and considerations
for drafting and implementing an AUP in
an organization.

The Internet and its associated technologies
have created a revolutionary change in the
way business information flows. With the
click of a button, we can communicate, order
products, or track competitor activities, among
other things. However, the Internet can be
misused. The U.S. Treasury Department found
that non-work-related computing (NWRC),
such as online shopping, checking personal
finances, answering personal emails, and
using chat rooms, accounted for 51 percent
of an employee’s time online (Davis, 2001).
Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) refer to the
lost productivity that takes place directly
after granting employees Internet access as a
“productivity vacuum,” where the easy access
to non-work-related activities is too tempting
for employees to resist. In addition to the lost
productivity, misuse of the Internet can cause
other problems such as security concerns and
reduced bandwidth, along with legal issues
such as racist, sexist, and offensive materials
being transmitted via email (Case and Young,
2002a, 2002b). This gives management
motivation to try to reduce or eliminate NWRC.

Keywords: Non-work-related computing,
general deterrence theory, Internet abuse,
Internet acceptable use policy, self-control
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Some organizations try to curb NWRC by
blocking access to unauthorized Internet sites;
but due to the dynamic nature of the Internet,
keeping a list of unauthorized sites updated
can be difficult and time consuming. Instead,
many organizations rely primarily on Internet
acceptable use policies (AUPs). AUPs attempt
to control NWRC by providing guidelines on
appropriate computer use, and outline how
the organization will monitor, enforce, and
punish non-work-related activities (Lee and
Lee, 2002; Woon and Pee, 2004). Despite the
widespread use of AUPs1, NWRC has continued
to grow (Lee and Lee, 2002; Lee, Lim, and
Wong, 2005; Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002). In
addition, managers encounter a catch-22 when
introducing AUPs. Potential positive effects
of AUPs, such as keeping employees on task,
can be counteracted by reduced workplace
satisfaction and trust (Urbaczewski and Jessup,
2002). Despite the high degree of abuse shown
in many studies, employees often use the
Internet for short personal tasks or during
breaks, which are not detrimental to the
organization and would be consumed by other
non-work-related tasks if the Internet were
not available (Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002).
Thus managers must make a decision about the
amount of NWRC they are willing to tolerate to
balance productivity and morale.
This paper helps resolve this paradox by
providing insights into how effectively various
components of an Internet acceptable use
policy deters non-work-related computing.
In other words, which components of an
AUP give managers the most “bang-for-thebuck?” By using a multi-criteria decision-

capturing approach (policy capturing), this
study addresses these issues by examining
how specific components of an AUP stack up
against one another in deterring an employee’s
intention to perform NWRC.

Internet Acceptable Use Policy (AUP)
Organizations are concerned about the
consequences of NWRC, including lost
productivity, potential legal liability, and
poor corporate image. Many are resorting
to AUPs for deterrence (Case and Young,
2002a; Greenfield and Davis, 2002). Typical
components of an AUP are:
1. an explanation of the scope of the AUP, (e.g.
who and what does it apply to)
2. a statement defining appropriate use
3. examples of appropriate versus
inappropriate use
4. a statement defining punishment for
inappropriate use
5. a statement about the extent of monitoring,
and
6. a signature of the reader acknowledging
that they have received and understand the
policy (Siau, Nah, & Teng, 2002)
Even though AUPs are widespread, most
companies do not actively enforce their policy
(Greenfield and Davis, 2002). Despite the
lack of enforcement, the mere adoption of
an AUP by an organization has been shown
to mitigate NWRC behavior due to increased
employee awareness of the policy (Harrington,
1996; Lee and Lee, 2002; Lee et al., 2005).
However, as mentioned in the introduction,

…non-work-related computing (NWRC), such as online shopping,
checking personal finances, answering personal emails, and
using chat rooms, accounted for 51 percent of an employee’s
time online.
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Urbaczewski and Jessup (2002) suggest that
regardless of their potential benefits, AUPs
can reduce workplace satisfaction and trust;
this is particularly exacerbated by monitoring
mechanisms. Thus, it is important that firms
do not implement deterrence measures
haphazardly and instead try to implement
mechanisms that have the greatest ratio of
deterrence to dissatisfaction. To this end, the
current paper presents an exploratory study to
answer the research question:
What is the relative impact of specific control
mechanisms commonly found in AUPs on
deterring NWRC?

AUPs from a General Deterrence
Perspective
General deterrence theory (GDT) provides
a theoretical foundation for proposing and
evaluating deterrence components within
an AUP, and based on GDT we are able
to hypothesize the relative importance
of several of the deterrence components.
Under general deterrence theory, individuals
make rational risk/reward decisions based
on their expected gratification from taking
advantage of opportunities, versus their
perceptions of the likelihood and severity
of potential consequences. GDT has long
been the foundation for crime prevention. It
provides insights on how security measures can
discourage illicit behaviors. GDT has been used
by criminologists to examine the effects of laws
on crime, but it has only recently been used to
look at workplace issues such as NWRC (Lee
et al., 2005; Lee and Lee, 2002; Woon and Pee, 2004).
AUPs comply with GDT because they clarify
unethical Internet use and raise employee

consciousness to the potential for negative
repercussions for abusive behavior. Specifically,
AUPs explicate the potential severity of
consequences, and by revealing the existence
of security and detection systems, they create
awareness to the likelihood of consequences
coming about.
Researchers who have examined the impact
of penalties on intentions to perform NWRC
found that the mere awareness of others being
reprimanded for performing NWRC reduced
user intentions (Lee and Lee, 2002; and Woon
and Pee, 2004). This is an intuitively logical
finding and we conjecture that enforcement
is the key determinant on deterring user
intentions. Even when an individual is likely to
get caught performing NWRC (for example, by
detection systems) and potential ramifications
are severe, those mechanisms will have
relatively little salience without enforcement.
This can be easily illustrated with a short
analogy. Imagine that fines for highway
speeding and the number of highway patrol
officers are greatly increased. Yet you are not
aware that the speed laws are ever enforced;
everyone just gets a warning. Would you
expect drivers to be compelled to comply with
speed limits in this case? Probably not.
Kelman (1958) was one of the first to use this
line of thinking. Kelman found that individual
beliefs tend to change to conform with
another party’s rules when the other party
is able to deliver punishment, is described to
be socially acceptable, or is described to be
highly credible. This has been extended to the
business context by various authors (Tyler 2001;
Tyler and Blader, 2005).
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Based on this, we conjecture that the
awareness that sanctions are being enforced
will make the threat of sanctions more credible
and increase perceptions about the likelihood
of punishment, and will thus be the most
salient deterrent on NWRC.
H1:	Enforced sanctions will have the greatest
degree of deterrence on NWRC.
Even without awareness of enforcement, we
expect that the threat of sanctions will still
have a relatively strong impact on deterring
NWRC, particularly if the level of sanction is
strong, such as getting fired. GDT suggests
that individuals weigh potential sanctions
against the gratification received from an illicit
act. Thus, these sanctions are important in a
decision maker’s mental account. Based on
this, we suggest that the threat of sanctions,
regardless of whether or not a decision maker
is aware of the sanctions being enforced, will
have a high level of deterrence on NWRC as
compared to other common components of an
AUP.
H2: The threat of sanctions will have a high
degree of deterrence on NWRC relative
to other components of an AUP.
We also expect detection systems to have
a strong affect. Detection systems increase
perceptions of the likelihood of sanctions being
enforced (Hollinger and Clark, 1983). Based
on this we expect detection systems to have
significant impact on deterring NWRC relative
to other common components of an AUP.
H3: D
 etection systems will have a high
degree of deterrence on NWRC relative
to other components of an AUP.
Signing an Internet acceptable use policy may

not link directly to general deterrence theory,
but we expect it to enhance other control
mechanisms. For instance, signing a statement
saying that one has read and will comply
with the AUP will make the individual more
mindful of the AUP’s components. Case and
Young (2002b) found anecdotal evidence that
deterrence will be enhanced when employees
are required to sign a statement indicating
that they agreed to comply with the AUP at
their organization. They found that 60 percent
of participants who were required to sign
their Internet use policy felt the policy was an
effective deterrent. However, since signing a
statement does not deter non-work-related
computing itself, we do not expect it to have a
strong relative impact on NWRC.
Finally, an AUP that merely outlines acceptable
use may affect NWRC intentions by raising
awareness to what type of behavior is
acceptable to the employer. Using Kelman’s
perspective, this would have an impact if the
respondent feels that it is socially desirable to
follow the rules outlined in the AUP. However,
the pervasiveness of NWRC seems to indicate
that it is developing into a socially acceptable
behavior. Based on this, we expect that merely
outlining acceptable behavior will have a low
relative impact on NWRC.

The Study
The study used a procedure for examining
multi-criteria decisions (policy capturing)
that is most commonly used to develop an
understanding of the relative salience of
available pieces of information on a decision
(e.g. Butler and Cantrell, 1984; Pearson, Crosby
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and Shim, 1996). The results of a policycapturing analysis provide an additive linear
model that illustrates how a decision-maker
weighs available information (cues) to arrive at
a decision (Karren and Barringer, 2002). Kline
and Sulsky (1995, p. 394) state that “the goal of
this approach is to understand an individual’s
decision-making “policy” by observing the
relationships between the decision cues given
to the individual, and the final decision made
by the individual and then modeling that
relationship using an idiographic multiple
regression analysis (i.e., regression analysis
carried out for a single individual). The results
of the analysis provide a description of how the
individual decision-maker weights the various
cues to arrive at his or her decision. Thus,
within the constraints of the cue information
presented, each individual’s decision-making
“policy” can be observed.”

We surveyed 87 people at 12 companies
representing a wide variety of industries
throughout the Midwest. Participants were
given 20 unique scenarios2 covering all
combinations of the independent variables
with the existence of each independent
variable, or cue, indicated by a yes or no
statement. Considering each scenario,
respondents were asked a question about
whether or not they would use their company’s
resources for personal use. The respondents
were also asked whether or not they would
use their company’s resources for personal
use if they worked in a cubicle or an office
(Appendix 1). In addition to the scenarios,
basic demographic information was collected,
along with open-ended questions about how
the participants felt about NWRC in general
and whether or not they felt NWRC was an
inappropriate behavior.

The cues (or independent variables), in this
study are:

The policy-capturing analysis involved
performing a multiple regression for each
respective participant on each of the 20
scenarios. The relative salience of each cue is
represented by the average of the individual
beta weights. The pairwise differences of the
average beta weights were tested for
statistical significance using Tukey’s honestly
significant difference (HSD).

1. the perceived existence of an acceptable use
policy
2. the degree of punishment for performing
NWRC
3. awareness of others receiving punishment
for NWRC
4. evidence of detection systems, and
5. a signature by the participant (employee) on
the acceptable use policy, which indicates
that they have received it.
The final decision (or dependent variable) is the
individual’s intention to perform NWRC.

Results
In general, enforcement resulted in the
greatest reduction on intentions to perform
NWRC. Enforcement was initiated by
presenting respondents with a scenario that
indicated that others had been fired for NWRC.
This was followed by sanctions (possibly getting

Despite the high degree of abuse shown in many studies,
employees often use the Internet for short personal tasks or during
breaks, which are not detrimental to the organization…
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fired or not), detection systems, an AUP that
merely communicates what types of computing
is acceptable, and finally signing or certifying
that one has read, understands, and will abide
by the policy (Exhibit 1). This hierarchy did not
change considering the participant’s perceived
level of privacy, an office or a cubicle.
The test of pairwise differences indicates that
the marginal impact of sanctions, detection

systems, and enforcement activities were not
significantly different from one another, and
the impact of sanctions, detections systems
and outlining acceptable Internet use were
not different from one another. Requiring
individuals to sign a statement indicating they
had read, understand, and will abide by the
policy had the smallest marginal impact and
was significantly different than the other cues.

Exhibit 1. Study Results
DV1 (Overall
Likelihood to
perform NWRC)

DV2 (Overall
Likelihood to
perform NWRC
if in an Office)

DV3 (Overall
Likelihood to
perform NWRC
if in an Cubicle)

Beta
Mean

Group
Rank

Beta
Mean

Beta
Mean

Group
Rank

You are aware of others within the
organization being fired for
performing non- work-related activities
on their computers.

-0.381

1		

-0.375

1

-0.381

1

The company’s Internet use policy
contains a statement stating that you
may be fired if you perform non-workrelated activities on your computer.

-0.292

1,2		

-0.264

1

-0.285

1

The company employs security
detection systems capable of
monitoring your computer usage.

-0.268

1,2		

-0.271

1

-0.261

1

The company employs an Internet
use policy that states what types of
Internet use are acceptable.

-0.248

2		

-0.259

1

-0.260

1

You are required to sign the Internet
use policy indicating that you have read, -0.100
understand, and will abide by the policy.

3		

-0.097

2

-0.089

2

Independent Variables
Decision Cues
(Deterrence Measures)

Group
Rank

*** Group Rank 1 is the highest rated group and is significantly different from 2 and 3; 2 is the second highest
rated group and is significantly different 1 and 3; and 3 is the third highest rated group and is significantly
different from 1 and 2. Cues that are rated 1, 2 are significantly different from only the cue rated 3.
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Analysis and Discussion
As we conjectured, the components of the
AUP that could be linked to GDT—sanctions,
detection systems, and enforcement—were
highly salient. The component that doesn’t
seem to have a link to GDT is the signature
requirement, which was the lowest-rated cue
and was significantly different from the other
four cues. Surprisingly, implementing a policy
that merely outlines what type of behavior is
acceptable was equally as effective as sanctions
and detection systems statistically.
From a policy-maker perspective, this seems
to indicate that severe sanctions that are
likely to be enforced are relatively effective
ways to deter NWRC. This gives a signal to
employers that if NWRC is a significant problem
within their organization, they may want to
implement a policy that includes potential
sanctions that the employer is prepared to
enforce. However, if NWRC is only a minor issue
within their organization, a policy that merely
outlines acceptable use may suffice and, in fact,
may have the most cost benefit considering
the potential loss of workplace satisfaction
and trust that can occur when more intrusive
mechanisms are introduced.

To give additional insight into the results,
we solicited open-ended responses related
the participant’s feelings on the topic, and
they yielded many interesting comments. In
general, employees felt that occasional use
of the Internet for personal purposes is not a
problem. They seem to feel that employer’s
demands have increased over the years; thus
the separation of work and personal time
gets blurred and employees have no choice
but to manage some personal issues while
at work. However, many employees felt that
their employer should have a policy as long
as it is fair. For example, one employee states,
“there needs to be a policy, but a policy that
can be fair and enforced.” There were also
many comments about pornography. and
in general employees feel it should not be
tolerated. It seems the general attitude among
the employees surveyed is that NWRC is not
a problem, which is contradictory to Davis’s
(2002) findings. However, the employees seem
to feel that a policy is still in order. This seems
to indicate that employees feel that certain
types of NWRC are acceptable, while others are
not. Exhibit 2 illustrates respondent’s general
concerns towards NWRC. These concerns give
some insight into how workplace norms may
be developing.

Exhibit 2. Employee Concerns
1. Occasional use of the Internet for personal purposes is acceptable.
2. Pornography should not be tolerated.
3. Increasing employer demands are forcing employees to manage personal issues at work.
4. The feel that the NWRC is not a major issue.
5. Even though the NWRC is not a major issue, a policy is still in order.
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Management Implications and
Directions for Future Research
The implication of these results for
practitioners is that an Internet acceptable use
policy outlining acceptable uses does provide
a degree of deterrence, but the effectiveness
of the AUP can be enhanced by including a
statement indicating severe consequences (e.g.,
you may be fired for viewing pornography).
With that said, the employer must be prepared
to enforce the policy since the most salient
component to our participants was the
awareness of enforcement. In addition, security
measures that increase the likelihood of
detection are important relative to other
AUP components.
Yet despite the understanding that this study
gives us about the relative importance of
deterrence measures, managers are still left
with a dilemma about which components
to implement and how severe to set the
punishment, since enforcement does not come
without cost and as mentioned previously,
monitoring activities can create employee
discontent (Urbaczewski and Jessup, 2002).
There are several items that management
should consider when implementing an AUP
(see Exhibit 3).
• First, what type of employees does the firm
have? If the typical employee’s job requires
considerable use of the Internet, an AUP
may be a more practical solution to NWRC
deterrence as compared with technologybased solutions such as access restriction,

where keeping a restricted website list can be
time consuming.
• Next, what type of culture does the
organization have? Would employees accept
an AUP? If employees are accustomed to
a relaxed environment, implementing a
restrictive policy could create disgruntlement,
particularly if it involves monitoring
Internet activity.
• Third, the punishment should fit the offense.
It would seem to be impractical to threaten
dismissal for relatively small infractions such
as managing personal finances or emailing
friends, as compared to more serious issues
such as viewing pornography.
 owever, habitual use of any kind can cause
H
a productivity issue. We suggest NWRC
infractions of any kind should be carefully
documented in employee personnel files.
This will allow the organization to more easily
recognize those that are repeat offenders
and give adequate documentation in case
ramifications are in order.
• Next, what is the cost of implementation,
particularly the implementation of
detection measures?
• Finally, if the firm has decided to implement
an AUP, management should create buyin. Surprising employees with a new policy
such as an AUP could exacerbate potential
employee dissatisfaction. We suggest that
firms make their employees fully aware of
implications and ramifications of an AUP, and

The awareness that sanctions are being enforced will …
increase perceptions about the likelihood of punishment, and will
thus be the most salient deterrent …
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employees be given an opportunity to voice
opinions before the AUP is implemented.
However, we propose that as AUPs continue
to become more common in the workplace,
employees will be more familiar with AUPs
and employee dissatisfaction will diminish.
Despite our findings, there are still
unanswered questions that could impact
many organizations. We suggest that the
salience of the AUP components examined
here will change if they are implemented
to different degrees. For example, at what
level of punishment does the threat lose
its effectiveness? Future researchers should
extend this study by focusing on the impact of
different levels of AUP components.
We also question how well an AUP will work
on employees that work from home. We have
suggested that the level of privacy, either in
an office or a cubicle, has no bearing on the
salience of AUP components. However, we
recommend that future researchers examine
other settings, such as a home office.

Finally, due to the global nature of business
and the Internet, we feel it is important to
understand how AUPs are accepted in different
cultures. For example, are individuals in cultures
that rate higher in uncertainty avoidance more
likely to find the mere existence of a policy
more salient, or do the findings about the lack
of difference between men and women hold
in cultures that are more or less masculine?
We suggest that future researchers test our
model globally.

Limitations
The study has several limitations, most notably
measuring participant intentions rather than
actual behavior. However, research in many
contexts; including ethics, have relied on the
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) to
understand how behavioral intentions lead to
action.
The next limitation is that this study treats all
forms of non-work-related computing equally,
as if time wasted shopping or browsing stock

Exhibit 3. Management Considerations
1. What type of employees does the firm have? Is it feasible to restrict Internet usage?
2. What is the corporate culture? Will it accept an AUP?
3. The punishment should fit the crime.
4. Document all NWRC infractions.
5. What is the cost?
6. Create buy-in.

